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COMMENTS
ASYLUM FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: IS PROTECTION POSSIBLE AFTER
IN RE R-A-?
Megan Annitto'

Protection and assistance for domestic violence victims in the United
States has improved substantially during the past twenty years' as recognition of the pervasive and severe nature of violence against women has
increased. Consequently, law enforcement agencies, the court system,
'J.D. candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 242 (1989) ("Until the late
1970s, there were almost no shelters, counseling services, or vocational training programs
for victims of domestic violence."). By the early 1980s, however, several hundred shelters
were in operation, and the majority of jurisdictions had established funding mechanisms
for battered-women programs. See id.; see also SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE
VIOLENCE 11 (1982) (noting that in 1976 in New York City "with a population estimated
at more than 8 million people, [there were] 1000 beds for homeless men and 45 for homeless women"). But see The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1902. On May 15, 2000, the United States Supreme Court struck down
portions of the VAWA, holding that gender-motivated crimes do not involve the type of
economic activity encompassed by Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. See
Joan Biskupic, Justices Reject Lawsuits for Rape, WASH. POST, May 16, 2000, at Al. The
Court also invalidated the Act's private remedy to enforce Fourteenth Amendment civil
rights, finding that although Congress determined that discriminatory stereotypes about
rape victims impaired the ability of local authorities to investigate and prosecute rape, the
Act improperly targeted individual wrongdoing, rather than the requisite state action. See
id.
2. See RHODE, supra note 1, at 242. This Comment deals with spousal abuse or domestic violence, as it relates to women. As a result, this Comment often employs the pronoun "she" when the discussion focuses on claims made by women because women are
most likely to be the victims of intimate violence. See KERRY HEALEY ET AL., U.S.
DEP'T.

OF

JUSTICE,

BATTERER

INTERVENTION:

PROGRAM

APPROACHES

AND

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STRATEGIES xi (1998) (finding that in 1992 over 1,000,000 women
were victimized by intimates compared to 143,000 men). In addition, the consequences of
domestic violence to society include:
physical and psychological damage to victims, deaths, increased health care costs,
prenatal injury to infants, increased homelessness of women and children, physical and psychological damage to children exposed to violence in their homes, and
corresponding increases in demand for social, medical, and criminal justice services.
Id.
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and communities' have created better
services
and protections to help
S •
4
women who are in abusive relationships.
The same public recognition of violence against women, however, is
not present in many other countries. Domestic violence is a global
problem affecting an estimated 25 million women every year.6 It is also
the leading cause of death among women.7 In addition to domestic violence, millions of women worldwide suffer from rape, female genital mutilation (FGM), infanticide, and "bride burning." 8 Yet, in many cultures,
women do not have a viable means of redress. 9 Poor socioeconomic con3. See SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 160. The women's movement worked legislatively to ensure that spouse abuse became a crime. See id. at 159. The movement recognized, however, that effective police response was crucial to create genuine change. See id.
at 157-58. Before the movement, police did not weigh the possibilities that abuse would
result in homicide. See id. at 158. Policies advocated avoidance of arrest in situations of
spousal abuse. See id. at 157. One commentator noted that police departments' general
attitudes resulted in "institutional complicity." Id. at 160. Battered women's groups filed
class action suits charging the police and court with "gross failure to comply with the law"
in order to affect systemic change. Id. For example, in New York City, the Litigation
Coalition for Battered Women filed a lawsuit that resulted in a settlement requiring that
the police must: arrest men who commit felonious assaults; respond in person to every call
from a woman being abused; make arrests in misdemeanor cases; where a husband has
violated a family court protection order, assist a woman in obtaining medical attention;
and to search for batterers who flee the scene of the crime as they would search for any
other criminal suspect. See id. This settlement illustrates societal recognition that lack of
state assistance perpetuated, if not enabled, some situations of domestic violence to continue without consequences.
4. See generally, HEALEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 97 (providing numerous examples
of programs and support that are available to women in the United States who need assistance due to abuse). Chapter Six of the Department of Justice's Batterer Intervention:
ProgramApproaches and CriminalJustice Strategies includes resources for batterer intervention and training materials, criminal justice materials and information, a list of national
organizations concerned with domestic violence, identification of state coalitions on domestic violence, and a list of individuals with expertise in batterer intervention nationwide.
See id.
5. See United Nations, Understanding the Problem, in WOMEN AND VIOLENCE:
REALITIES AND RESPONSES WORLDWIDE 2 (Miranda Davies ed., 1994) (concluding that
marital violence exists worldwide, however, some communities deny its existence because
of their belief in the importance of family privacy) [hereinafter Understandingthe Problem]; see also PIRKKO KOURULA, BROADENING THE EDGES: REFUGEE DEFINITION &
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION REVISITED 138 (1997).
6. See id. (reporting that some estimates indicate that more than 25 million women
worldwide are beaten every year).
7. See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 312 (1994).
8. See Rebecca M.M. Wallace, Men, Their Rights and Nothing More; Women Their
Rights and Nothing Less, 58 SASK. L. REV. 217, 219 (1994) (Ariel F. Sallows lecture delivered March 14, 1994 at the University of Saskatchewan).
9. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Refugee Law Center and International Human
Rights/Migration Project in support of Respondent's Response to Govt's Appeal at 7, In
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ditions make it even more difficult for women to leave abusive relationships because of limited resources. 0 Where no social programs or court
protections are in place, women have few options for safety." Victims of
gender-based violence, therefore,
increasingly are seeking safety in other
2
countries under asylum law.'
There is "universal agreement" that the international community must
address the needs of refugee women. 3 In 1991, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees issued guidelines on the protection of refugee women. Three years later, in response to reports of widespread
violence against women, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
a declaration to eliminate violence against women. 5 Similarly, in March
1994, the Commission on Human Rights appointed a special rapporteur
16
on violence against women.
The international community has begun to recognize violence against
women in the home as a serious violation of human rights. 7 In 1996, the
special rapporteur specifically recommended that governments interpret
refugee and asylum laws "to include gender-based claims of persecution,

re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999) [hereinafter Amici Brief]. "The problem of impunity is exacerbated in cases of domestic violence where both 'the police and the courts
tend to view domestic violence as a family affair and generally encourage women seeking
their help to keep the problem to themselves."' Id. (quoting a report prepared by the Information and Research Branch of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board).
10. See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 7 (concluding that, although women of all
socioeconomic classes are victims of domestic violence, women with limited economic independence "must often rely exclusively on the criminal justice system for protection").
11. See Deborah Anker et al., Women Whose Governments are Unable or Unwilling
to Provide Reasonable Protectionfrom Domestic Violence May Qualify as Refugees Under
United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709, 733-35 (1997) (noting that states
often fail to protect women against violence by non-state and state actors); see also Amici
Brief, supra note 9, at 7 (stating that there are no shelters for battered women in Guatemala).
12. See generally Anker et al., supra note 11.
13. See KOURULA, supranote 5, at 139.
14. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR),
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECrION OF REFUGEE WOMEN (1991).

15. Declarationon the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 111, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1994).
16. See E.S.C. Res. 45, U.N. ECSOR, 50th Sess., 56th mtg, 6, U.N.
Doc./E/CN.4/RES/1994/45 (1994).
17. See Understanding the Problem, supra note 5, at 7 ("The right to be free from
domestic violence is a fundamental and human right."); see also Anker et al., supra note
11, at 717 (advocating for the INS to reinforce the promises made in the Gender Guidelines to "integrate women's rights as human rights into its doctrine and practice, and to
ensure equal and non-discriminatory treatment of the claims of women to asylum protection").
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including domestic violence."18 Subsequently, Canada, Australia, and the
United States issued guidelines to assist in the adjudication of genderbased claims; '9 and Canada, Australia, and Great Britain granted asylum
to victims of gender-based violence, ° including victims of domestic
abuse." Nevertheless, disagreement persists on how the global commu-

18. UNITED
NATIONS
HUMAN
RIGHTS
COMMISSION,
MS.
RADHIKA
COOMARASWAMY, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON VIOLENCE AGAINST

WOMEN, ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES at I 142(o), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/54

(1996).
19. See CANADIAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, GUIDELINES ON
WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION (March 1993)
[hereinafter CANADIAN GUIDELINES]; DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS OF AUSTL., REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN VISA
APPLICANTS: GUIDELINES ON GENDER ISSUES FOR DECISION MAKERS (1996) [hereinaf-

ter AUSTRALIAN GUIDELINES]; Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, to All INS Asylum Officers and Headquarters Coordinators on Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women (May 26, 1995) (on
file with the Catholic University Law Review) [hereinafter INS Guidelines].
20. See Amici Brief, supra note 9, at 10 n.4 (presenting an extensive list of cases
granting asylum for gender-based claimants). The Amici in In re R-A- cited and summarized the following examples:
Immigration and Refugee Board Decisions T93-10498 (Canada, July 27, 1994)
(granting refugee protection to a woman from Yugoslavia after attempted rape
by two government security agents); T93-07492 (Canada, July 27, 1994) (granting
refugee protection to Ghanaian union activist who was beaten and raped during
government detention); T93-12197/8/9 (Canada, May 10, 1994) (granting protection to [a] woman and her son and daughter based on inflicting of female genital
mutilation upon [her] daughter and mandatory loss of custody of children by [a]
mother under Somali laws) ... ; M.M.G. v. the Secretary of State for the Home
Department, Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Case No. TH/9515/85 (5216) (United
Kingdom, Feb. 25, 1987) (finding that penalties imposed upon women for transgressing the mores of dress and behavior in Iran can amount to persecution)... ;
Refugee Appeal No. 80/91 re: NS, (Refugee Status Appeals Authority) (New
Zealand, Feb. 20, 1992) (granting protection to woman based on membership in
a particular social group consisting of Moslem women living separate from their
husbands in Moslem community with no accommodation and no male family or
financial support available to them and with a reputation for having transgressed
the mores of their community).
Id. at 10-11 n.4.
21. See Anker et al., supra note 11, at 714-15 (noting that other parties to the U.N.
Refugee Convention have granted refugee status based on domestic violence). Domestic
violence is "well-established in Canadian case law, including decisions of the Canadian
Immigration and Refugee Board, and its federal courts." Id. at 714. Further, in Australia,
the Refugee Review Tribunal granted asylum to victims of domestic violence. See id. at
714-15. "According to the Australia's Refugee Review Tribunal's records, '[d]omestic
violence was an issue in 76 refugee cases between July 1993 and 31 December 1996 ....
Nineteen of the claimants in these cases were successful in their appeals,"' which constituted 25% of the 76 domestic violence cases. Id. at 715 n.23. These cases accounted for
only 0.19% of all refugee board decisions during that time, indicating that granting asylum
to these victims does not open the floodgate for domestic violence claims. See id.
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22

nity should implement the recommendations of the special rapporteur.
United States decision makers began implementing the recommendations by recognizing gender-based asylum claims.23 For example, the
Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board or BIA) gave hope to advowhen it
cates for women attempting to escape gender-based violence
24
recognized FGM as extreme persecution in In re Kasinga.
Just as the door was opening to gender-based asylum claims, however,
the Board seemed to slam it shut in In re R-A-.2 ' There, the Board denied protection to Rodi Alvarado Pena, a woman whose life was in danger in Guatemala because of an ongoing pattern of spousal abuse.26 This
decision, coming just three years after Kasinga, drastically altered the
course of adjudication of gender-based claims.2 1 In re R-A- indicates that
American immigration courts are far from accepting asylum law as the
status. 2 8
appropriate forum for domestic violence victims seeking refugee
Despite this profound setback, the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT) 29 may open a new door for these victims. Proponents
of the CAT believe that it will afford protection to people rejected under
traditional asylum procedures.3"
This Comment examines the framework of asylum cases in the context
of domestic violence and gender related violence. Part I outlines the ap22. See KOURULA, supra note 5, at 139 (discussing the need for state endorsement of
legal measures on behalf of refugee women, but recognizing that a debate exists regarding
the definition of persecution).
23. See In re Kasinga, Interim Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June 13, 1996)
(granting asylum based on gender related violence to an applicant asserting a fear of
FGM).
24. See id.; see also Connie M. Ericson, In re Kasinga: An Expansion of the Grounds
for Asylum for Women, 20 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 671, 672 (1998) (contending that the decision
"may provide a broader basis for findings of persecution in other gender related asylum
claims than has been available in the past").
25. Interim Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999); see Karen Musalo, Matter of R-A-: An Analysis of
the Decision and Its Implications,76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1177, 1177, 1185 (1999).
26. See Interim Dec. 3403 at 2.
27. See Musalo, supranote 25, at 1177, 1185-86.
28. Cf. Interim Dec. 3403 at 27 ("The solution to the respondent's plight does not lie
in our asylum laws as they are currently formulated."). Women's rights advocates have
assailed the decision. See Fredric Tulsky, Abused Woman is Denied Asylum: Immigration
Ruling Reflects Split Over Gender Persecution,WASH. POST, June 20,1999, at Al.
29. Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
CAT]; see also Pub. L. 105-277 § 2242(b) (1998) (directing the heads of appropriate agencies to prescribe regulations implementing the CAT); 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2000) (setting
forth INS regulations implementing the CAT).
30. See Morton Sklar, Implications of the New Implementing Statute and Regulations
on Convention Against Torture Protections, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 265 (1999).
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plication procedure for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality
Act 3' (INA or the Act). Part I also explores case law of the United States
and other jurisdictions that interprets the elements of the Act relevant to
domestic violence. In Part II, this Comment discusses the principle case,
In re R-A-, and its implications for victims seeking protection in the
United States. In Part III, this Comment considers the CAT as an untapped alternative for domestic violence victims. Finally, in Part IV, this
Comment argues that the forced return of Rodi Alvarado, and women
like her, to situations of serious, and possibly life threatening, danger is
inconsistent with both international standards of human rights law and
domestic policy.
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
ADJUDICATION OF GENDER-BASED CLAIMS

ACT IN

A. Process of Application for Asylum: The Immigration
and Nationality Act
The INA implements the United States' international treaty obligations, and sets forth the legal standards for asylum claims.3 2 The Act allows persons fleeing persecution to apply for refugee status in order to
remain in the United States.33 The fundamental purpose of refugee law is
to provide surrogate protection where there is a fundamental breakdown
in state protection. Under the Act, a person must first establish that she
suffered persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution.35 Second,
she must establish that the harm was inflicted "on account of' one of the
five enumerated categories: race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion."
31. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (Supp. III 1997) (providing procedures for inspection of asylum applicants for admission to the United States).
32. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as
amended at Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(1994)). The United States adopted its asylum laws from the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, and the 1967
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267 (1968). The United States acceded to the Protocol in 1968. Article 1,
section 1 of the Protocol provides that by ratifying it, all signatory nations are also bound
by Articles 2-34 of the Refugee Convention. Congress incorporated the right to seek asylum protection into United States law in the Refugee Act of 1980. See INA § 101(a)(42).
33. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).
34. See INS Guidelines, supra note 19, at 16.
35. See id.
36. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994). The Act defines a "refugee" as:
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Upon application for asylum, an immigration officer determines
whether an alien may be inadmissible because of fraud or lack of appropriate documentation.37 If the applicant indicates a fear of persecution or
requests asylum, an asylum officer makes a preliminary determination of
whether she has a "credible fear of persecution. '3 8 The officer then reviews the application during an interview with the applicant and decides
whether to grant asylum.3 9 If the officer denies the application, the officer refers the alien to an immigration judge (IJ) for removal proceedto the Board of Immigraings. 40 An applicant may appeal an IJ decision
41
courts.
federal
the
to
then
and
Appeals,
tion
B. The Frameworkfor Gender-basedAsylum Claims Priorto the Board's
Decision in In re R-A1. Gender-based Violence as Persecution
Under the Act, Applicants must show evidence of past persecution or
a well-founded fear of future persecution.42 United States courts define
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case
of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Id.
See
Some commentators consider the refugee definition to be gender-biased.
KOURULA, supra note 5, at 131 ("The absence of the term 'sex' or 'gender' as a ground for
persecution has led to practical difficulties in the application of the definition.").
37. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (2000) (procedure for interview before an asylum officer).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii),(b)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. III 1998).
39. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.9.
40. See id. § 208.7.
41. See id. § 208.7(c)(2). Under certain circumstances, the Board must refer its decisions to the Attorney General for review. See id. § 3.1(h). Those circumstances include
when 1) the Attorney General directs, 2) the Chairman or a majority of the Board believe
the Attorney General should review the decision, and 3) the INS Commissioner requests
referral.
42. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (Supp. III 1998); see also Acewicz v. INS,
984 F.2d 1056, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 1993). This Comment concentrates on discussion of past
persecution. Where an applicant establishes past persecution, a well-founded fear of future persecution is a regulatory presumption. See 8 C.F.R. 208.13(b)(1)(i) (2000). The
INS must show by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions have changed, such
that the individual would no longer have a well-founded fear of future persecution. See id.
Gender-based claims also use a well-founded fear of future persecution in order to establish refugee status. See In re Kasinga, Interim Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June 13,
1996). Well-founded fear exists where a "reasonable person" in the circumstances of the
applicant would fear persecution. See Amici Brief, supra note 9, at 41 (citing In re
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987)). Therefore, an applicant must establish

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 49:785

persecution as the "threat to life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ in a way regarded as offensive. ' 3
Applying this standard, courts have ruled that any serious human rights
violation constitutes persecution.4 American courts recognize beating
and rape as persecution.4 1 In re D-V- affirmed that rape is persecution by
' 6
stating that "rape is not a sexual act per se, but also an act of violence.
Because instances of coerced sex and rape are often present in abusive
relationships,47 the determination that rape can be persecution is relevant
for domestic violence victims seeking asylum.48
Recognizing the special nature of gender-based asylum claims, the INS
has determined that violence and oppressive acts against women can
constitute human rights violations warranting asylum. 4 9 In 1995, to facilitate better consideration of claims brought by alien women, the INS issued guidelines ° (Guidelines or INS Guidelines) interpreting asylum law
that a "reasonable person" would fear that she will be subjected to the practice of FGM if
she returns to her country. See Kasinga, 1996 WL 379826.
43. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222-23 (BIA 1995) (citing cases employing this
definition).
44. See Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 1988).
45. See In re D-V-, Interim Dec. 3252 (BIA 1993).
46. Patricia Seith, Escaping Domestic Violence: Asylum as a Means of Protection for
Battered Women, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1804, 1833 (1997).
47. See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 ("Between 33 and 46 percent of battered
women are subjected to sexual abuse, such as rape (especially following other physical
violence), unwanted sexual practices, sexual mutilation, or forced or coerced prostitution."); see also Copelon, supra note 8, at 312 n.57 (reporting that the psychological effects
of rape in domestic violence are illustrated by the fact that women who eventually kill
their batterers were more likely to have been raped by the men than those who did not kill
their batterers).
48. In Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit held
that an applicant who was raped and mistreated while in military detention was persecuted
under the Act, and therefore entitled to asylum. Further, in Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d
1432 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit also recognized sexual violence as persecution.
There, a sergeant in the El Salvador military physically and sexually abused the applicant,
which the court found was persecution. See id. at 1434-35. But see Klattwitter v. INS,
970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1992) (ruling that "harms or threats of harm based solely on
sexual attraction do not constitute 'persecution' under the Act"). More recently, however,
the BIA has determined that rape is persecution. See Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border
Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 25, 40 & n.73 (1998).
Further, the INS Guidelinesstate that the "appearance of sexual violence in a claim should
not lead adjudicators to conclude automatically that the claim is an instance of purely personal harm." INS Guidelines, supra note 19, at 17.
49. See ASYLUM BRANCH, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, INS BASIC LAW MANUAL 20-21 (1991).
50. See INS Guidelines, supra note 19, at 5 (encouraging offices to assign a female
officer to cases when sensitive issues and evidence may be presented by a female claimant); see also Anker et al., supra note 11, at 710 ("Since adoption of the guidelines, many
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under the Act." The Guidelines, however, are binding only on asylum
officers, not on IJs or the Board.52
The Guidelines specifically provide that "[s]evere sexual abuse does
not differ analytically from beatings, torture, or other forms of physical
violence that are commonly held to amount to persecution."53 The law
distinguishes sexual abuse inflicted by private actors, however, from that
inflicted by state actors.54 This distinction creates problems of proof for
55
women asserting state involvement in their persecution."
a. Abuse By a State Actor Versus a PrivateActor
Although the gradual recognition of sexual abuse as persecution when
performed by state actors has improved asylum opportunities for female
victims of violence,56 courts are less likely to extend protection when the
assailant is a "private actor."57 Differentiating between public and private harm can hinder the claims of women by eliminating these women
from the realm of human rights protection. 58 As one commentator remarked: "women's rights are traditionally ignored or characterized as
private or personal, often resulting in women's exclusion from the discourse and implementation of national and international protection altogether."59
International human rights standards, however, do not require a persecutor to be a government actor for asylum purposes. 6° According to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, states may consider
asylum officers, immigration judges, and INS trial attorneys have shown greater sensitivity
in addressing gender-related asylum claims."); Macklin, supra note 48, at 36-37 (noting
that both the United States' and Australia's guidelines benefit claimants by encouraging
the assignment of female officers to these claims).
51. See INS Guidelines, supra note 19, at 1-4.
52. See Amici Brief, supra note 9, at 13 n.6 (explaining the relevance of the Guidelines).
53. Id. at 9.
54. See INS Guidelines, supra note 19, at 16-18 (summarizing the case law and international instruments that explain the distinctions between public and private acts in cases
of alleged gender-based persecution).
55. See Amici Brief, supra note 9, at 8.
56. See Macklin, supra note 48, at 28.
57. See id. at 39-40, 49.
58. See Anker et al., supra note 11, at 711.
59. Id. (comparing the rights of women with the rights of men).
60. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS

65, at 14-15 (1979) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK]; see also INS Guidelines, supra
note 19, at 17 (including in its list of potential persecutors: the government, a public official committing a seemingly private act, or "a person or group outside the government that
the government is unable or unwilling to control").
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acts of violence to be persecution "if they are knowingly tolerated by the
authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective
protection.""
Consistent with both INS and United Nations' guidance, United States
courts recognize the notion of private actors inflicting persecution. In
McMullen v. INS,62 the Ninth Circuit held that groups outside the control
of the established government can inflict persecution, and therefore
granted the asylum petition of an Irish applicant who presented
"[e]vidence of a pattern of uncontrolled [Provisional Irish Republican
Army] persecution of defectors."63 Hence, the foreign government does
not have to sanction the harm inflicted on the applicant explicitly in order for a U.S. decision maker to find persecution. Where society, rather
than government causes the persecution, one may attribute the65 abuse to
the state when the government is unable or unwilling to stop it.
Advocates for women argue that a husband who batters his wife
knowing his government will not punish him is acting under a government who is unwilling to stop the abuse. 66 American courts, however,
have been reluctant to make this connection in situations of domestic
61. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 60, at 17.
62. 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981).
63. Id. at 1318.
64. See id.; see also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). In Fatin, the applicant presented evidence that women in Iran suffer a penalty for refusing to conform to
gender-based laws and social norms. See id. at 1241. Punishments for non-conformance
include flogging, imprisonment, possibly rape, and death. See id. The court stated a precaution in viewing government action in relation to persecution, observing that "[t]he concept of persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair,
unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional." Id. at 1240. However, it also recognized the
effect of discriminatory laws on persecution stating that "the concept of persecution is
broad enough to include governmental measures that compel an individual to engage in
conduct that is not physically painful or harmful but is abhorrent to that individuals deepest beliefs." Id. at 1242. Nevertheless, the court denied the applicant's claim on other
grounds. See id. at 1241, 1244.
65. See In re M-K-, No. 1804A (Immigr. Ct., Arlington, Va., Aug. 9, 1995) (Immigration Judge's order granting asylum) (citing In re McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90 (BIA
1984)), available at <http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/caselaw/m-k-.html>.
66. See Anker et al., supra note 11, at 735.
The issue of impunity is fundamental. In some cases, there is virtually complete
impunity for violence perpetrated in the domestic sphere; states which fail to
take minimum steps necessary to protect women's rights to life and physical integrity "send a message that such attacks are justified and will not be punished."
Id. The law "'should not sit idly by while those who seek relief lose hope, and those who
abuse it are emboldened by its failure to provide sanctions. Unless penal measures are
effectively implemented to punish those guilty of wife abuse [the situation] will continue."'
Id. at 730 (quoting Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, Dec. No. U92-08714
(1993)).
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violence.67 Nevertheless, the reluctance is fading as evidenced by federal
court, BIA, and IJ case law recognizing sexual violence by non-state ac68
tors as persecution.
b. Ability to Find Safety in One's Own Country: Internal Flight
When an applicant cannot safely escape to another part of her country,
the harm committed by a private actor may amount to persecution.69 If
internal flight or escape in one's own country is a viable option, the INA
permits denial of asylum.70 Thus, in In re Acosta,71 the Board stated that
a woman is not eligible for asylum in the United States if she is able to
escape persecution in her own country.72 However, a domestic violence
victim may lack possibilities for protection in her country if her government does not intervene." Despite international recognition of domestic
violence as a human rights violation,74 many countries do not intervene
officially in even the most brutal cases, viewing domestic violence as a
private matter.75 Hence, the failure of government protection is relevant
to the analysis of internal flight possibilities for an applicant fleeing per76
secution.
To obtain asylum, the applicant must demonstrate that the government
does not have effective mechanisms to prevent, protect against, or punish
the violent actions. In In re Kasinga,77 the applicant fled her country in

67. See Macklin, supra note 48, at 49 ("Indeed the notion that domestic violence is
merely a 'private harm' committed by an individual man on an individual woman for personal reasons still figures into Australian and American refugee jurisprudence.").
68. See Anker et al., supra note 11, at 713-14.
69. See In re Kasinga, Interim Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June 13, 1996).
70. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (defining refugee); id.
§ 1158(c)(2)(A) (providing that the Attorney General may revoke a grant of asylum if a
person is no longer a refugee).
71. 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
72. See id. at 235-36.
73. See Anker et al., supra note 11, at 728-29 (acknowledging that "[s]tate failure occurs when the state does not provide reasonable protection from serious harms by nonstate actors"). "In other cases, there may be evidence of systemic failure to provide any
adequate legal structures of protection, either though formal laws or by implementation,
such as in situations in which social custom dictates that domestic violence is a tolerated
practice." Id. at 735. If the state has failed in its duty of protection, the violation may
amount to persecution. See id. at 728.
74. See, e.g., Declarationon the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res.
104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1994) (characterizing violence against women as a violation of human rights).
75. See Macklin, supra note 48, at 28.
76. See In re Kasinga, Interim Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June 13, 1996).
77. Id.
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order to avoid the painful and hazardous practice of FGM." The Board
rejected the INS' argument that the applicant could avoid FGM by
moving elsewhere in Togo, 79 relying on the following four factors:
1) FGM is widely practiced in the country; 2) acts of violence and abuse
against women are tolerated by police; 3) the government has a poor
human rights record; and 4) most African women "can expect little government protection from FGM."°
c. Proving PersecutionExists
Proving persecution and fear of persecution may present difficulties
for applicants, especially in gender-based claims.8 ' The court in Abankwah v. INSP discussed the amount of proof that is required for an applicant to prove a "well founded fear" of persecution.83
The applicant feared that if she returned to Ghana her tribe would
subject her to FGM. 84 In reversing and remanding the BIA's denial of
asylum, the Second Circuit held that Abankwah had established both
subjective and objective evidence that her fear was real. 5 Expert testimony on FGM in Ghana sufficiently established that Abankwah's fear
was objectively justified.86 The Court stated that "[w]ithout discounting
the importance of objective proof in asylum cases, it must be acknowledged that a genuine refugee does not flee her native country armed with
affidavits, expert witnesses, and extensive documentation." 87 The court
criticized the Board as being "too exacting both in the quantity and the
' The
quality of evidence that it required."88
court's analysis of the applicant's proof has possible implications for the quantum of proof required
to establish other elements of asylum claims.8 9
78.
79.

See id.
See id.

80. Id.
81. See id.
82. 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999).
83. See id. at 20-24.
84. See id. at 20. The Board denied asylum because it found that Abankwah failed to
demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear that her tribe would subject her to FGM and,
therefore, she did not have a well founded fear of persecution. See id.
85. See id. at 23-25. Federal regulations require the applicant to present credible,

specific, and detailed evidence, whether by her own testimony or corroborating proof, that
a reasonable person in her position would fear persecution if returned to her native country. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)-(b) (2000).
86. See Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 24.
87. Id. at 26.

88. Id. at 24.
89. See Musalo, supra note 25, at 1186 & nn. 76-77.
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2. Persecution "On Account Of' Social Group Membership and
PoliticalOpinion
a. Nexus: The Motivation Requirement of the Act
The Act requires an applicant to provide evidence regarding the motivation of the persecutor, known as the "nexus" between the protected
ground and the reasons for the infliction of harm.90 In INS v. EliasZacarias,9' the Supreme Court held that the applicant must present some
evidence that the persecutor harmed her at least in part "on account of"
a protected ground." Applicants must present evidence showing the motive of the person who is inflicting the harm.93 The Board, however, recognized the difficulty in proving motive in In re S-P-,94 stating that "an
asylum applicant is not obliged to show conclusively why persecution has
occurred or may occur."' Instead, the applicant need only produce evidence from which "it is reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated by a protected ground."'
b. Political Opinion
Political opinion is one of the possible qualifying categories for victims
of gender-related violence claiming asylum once they have satisfied the
persecution element.9 According to Singh v. Ilchert,98 in order to prevail
on an asylum claim based on political opinion, an applicant must specify
the political opinion on which she relies, show that she holds that opinion, and that she would be persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution because of that opinion."
In In re D-V-,m the Board granted asylum to a Haitian woman based

90. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994) (requiring "persecution on account of" five
statutory grounds in order to grant asyslum); see also INS Guidelines, supra note 19, at 10.
91. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
92. See id. at 482.
93. See id. at 483.
94. Interim Dec. 3287 (BIA 1996).
95. Id. at 5.
96. Id. at 6. Further, the Board found that requiring proof of the actual reason would
be inconsistent with the "well-founded fear" standard embodied in the definition of "refugee." See id.
97. See Macklin, supra note 48, at 56; see also Seith, supra note 46, at 1826. The categories are not mutually exclusive-courts allow an applicant to claim persecution upon
more than one ground. See, e.g., Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995).
98. 63 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1995).
99. See id. at 1509; see also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993).
100. Interim Dec. 3252 (BIA 1993).
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on her political opinion. Soldiers gang-raped and severely beat the
woman because she supported overthrown Haitian President Jean Bertran Aristide.' °' Therefore, her claim satisfied the requirements of the
Act because "she has suffered grievous harm in direct retaliation for her
support of and activities on behalf of Aristide."'' 2
In Lazo-Majano v. INS, °3 the Ninth Circuit recognized that the political opinion of an assailant might be imputed to the victim. Lazo-Majano
was a Salvadoran woman who suffered sexual abuse and beatings by an
army sergeant.'0 Thus, the court found that the sergeant was "asserting
the political opinion that a man has a right to dominate women, and that
he persecuted [the applicant] to force her to accept this opinion without
rebellion."'' 5 Similarly, the court in Argueta v. INS, °6 held that an applicant may establish a claim based on imputed political opinion., °7 It is irrelevant "whether the victim holds the political opinion imputed to her
or him, so long as the persecutor believes the victim holds that belief."'' 8
Finally, the Guidelines state that an applicant who can demonstrate
persecution "on account of her (or his) beliefs about the role and status
of women in society could be eligible for refugee status on account of
political opinion."' This INS policy, coupled with case law establishing
feminism as a political opinion, provided a foundation for domestic violence claims before In re R-A-.

101. See id. at 3-4.
102. Id. at 4-5. This case is significant for gender-based violence claims because the
Board affirmed that rape is a form of persecution, see id. at 3-4, and later declared this position as binding precedent after the INS issued its gender Guidelines. See Seith, supra
note 46, at 1833 & n.200. In Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993), the court
opined in dicta that a woman opposing male domination, abuse by her husband, and societal violence toward women might be expressing a political opinion; specifically, feminism.
Although the court observed that feminism is a "political opinion within the meaning of
the relevant statutes," the court upheld the BIA's decision not to grant the applicant asylum because the administrative record failed to "establish that Iranian feminists are generally subjected to treatment so harsh that it may accurately be described as 'persecution."'
Id.
103. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
104. See id. at 1435.
105. Id. at 1435-36; see also Musalo, supra note 25, at 1183 (discussing In re R-A- and
mentioning Lazo-Majano).
106. 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
107. See id. at 1397.
108. Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1985). But see INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1991) (noting that in order to satisfy § 101(a)(42) of the Act,
the persecution must be "on account of" the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's, thus creating some confusion as to the application of imputed political opinion).
109. INS Guidelines, supra note 19, at 11.
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c. Social Group Membership
The strongest argument for gender-based claims is that the persecution
is on account of social group membership." ° The United Nations Executive Committee on Refugee Women and International Protocol urges
states to interpret a "particular social group" to include "women asylumseekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live.'
In the United States, in order to establish membership in a particular
social group, decision makers "focus on whether the group is cognizable,
cohesive, and whether its members are being singled out for persecution."'" 2 In In re Acosta,"3 the Board interpretedthe Act to require two
elements to prove persecution because of social group membership.
First, the applicant must prove that the common characteristic defining
the group remains permanent." 4 Second, the characteristic must be one
that the group members should not be required to change because of its
fundamental nature."' Acosta also suggests that sex may be a defining
characteristic."' The Board's dicta left room for interpretation regarding
''7
whether "women" can qualify as a social group.
Following Acosta, the Third Circuit opined that women opposing a
110. See Seith, supra note 46, at 1825-26 ("Asylum claims based on persecution on account of social group membership are the most promising for gender related claims, including domestic violence claims."); see also Karen Bower, Note, Recognizing Violence
Against Women as Persecution on the Basis of Membership in a ParticularSocial Group,
7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 173, 181-86 (1993). See generally Macklin, supra note 48.
111. Refugee Women and International Protection,U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Comm. Conclusion No. 39(k) (1985), available at <http://www.unhcr.ch/
refworld/unhcr/excom/xconc/excom39.htm>.
112. In re Alvarado, No. A73-753-922, slip op. at 9 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Cal.,
Sept. 20, 1996), rev'd, In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999); see also Sanchez-Trujillo
v. INS, 801 F.2d 1572, 1574-75 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting out the considerations for determining membership in a specific social group); In re Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211
(BIA 1995); INS Guidelines, supra note 19, at 13. The Guidelines state that "membership
in a particular social group is perhaps the least clearly defined ground for eligibility as a
refugee." Id. (citing authority for the proposition that "courts and commentators ... have
'struggled' with the concept").
113. 19 1.& N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
114. See id. at 233.
115. See id. at 233-34 (holding that a member of a taxi driver cooperative did not qualify as a member of a particular social group for purposes of the Act). The court noted
that, in the case before it, the characteristics of being a member of the cooperative were
neither immutable nor fundamental to their beings. See id. at 234.
116. See id. at 233 (suggesting that the "shared characteristic might be an innate one
such as sex").
117. Cf Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 966 (9th Cir. 1996) (Canby, J., concurring) (noting
that it remains an open question whether gender can qualify as a social group).
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particular social policy might qualify as a social group in Fatin v. INS.'
Although the court upheld the Board's denial of Fatin's asylum petition,
it acknowledged that an Iranian woman who feared persecution in Iran
simply because she is a woman could satisfy the requirements for membership in a particular social group." 9 In making this assertion, the court
cited Acosta, stating that "the Board [in Acosta] specifically mentioned
'sex' as an innate characteristic that could link the members of a 'particular social group.",120 Similarly, in Kasinga, the Board also found that
the applicant was a member of a particular social group. 2' It defined the
group as "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not
had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.', 22 In
addition, IJs have granted asylum to victims of domestic violence "on account of" social group membership.'23
Some foreign courts recognize that women qualify as a social group.
In a recent appellate decision in Great Britain, the House of Lords addressed social group analysis in the context of abuse toward women. 124 In
Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,the House of Lords
stated, "[t]he discrimination against women, which is tolerated and sanctioned by the state in Pakistan, is the defining factual framework of this

118. 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993).
119. See id. at 1240. The court determined, however, that the applicant failed to demonstrate that she would suffer persecution based solely on her gender. See id.
120. Id.; see also Fisher,79 F.3d at 966 (Canby, J., concurring).
121. See In re Kasinga, Interim Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June 13, 1996).
122. Id.
123. See In re S-S-, No. A73-556-883 (Immigr. Ct., New York, N.Y., Sept. 27, 1996),
available at <http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/caselaw/ij/> (order granting asylum to a
Bangladeshi woman on account of her political opinion and membership in a social
group). The IJ defined the applicant's social group as "young, Westernized, educated
Muslim wives in Bangladesh ...subject to particular restraints and abuse sanctioned by
the state." Id. at 12. The applicant presented a history of spousal abuse in which even the
victim's in-laws participated, which the IJ found "consistent with the societal, religious,
finanical and legal framework" of Bangladesh. Id. The IJobserved that the mental aspects of spouse abuse were similar to torture because both forms of violence attempt to
subdue the "will of the victim in order to keep the oppressor in control." Id.; see also In re
A- & Z-, Nos. A72-190-893, A72-793-219 (Immigr. Ct., Arlington, Va., Dec. 20, 1994),
available at <http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/caselaw/ij/> (order granting asylum to a Jordanian woman who was a victim of domestic violence). In In re A- & Z-, the IJ granted
asylum on account of membership in a particular social group "of women who are challenging the traditions of Jordanian society and government." Id. at 15.
124. See Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, 2 [1999] All E.R. 545 (H.L.)
(1999) (conjoined appeal with Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal & Another Ex
Parte Shah). The Board recognized Islam in its nexus analysis in In re R-A-, however, the
Board noted that the United States' "on account of" principles compel at least a different
rationale than that expressed in Islam. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. No. 3403 at 16-17 n.2
(BIA 1999).
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case...... The treatment of women in the applicant's country of origin,
Pakistan, was1 critical
in the decision to grant asylum under "social group
26
membership.
The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (CIRB) has granted
asylum consistently for domestic violence victims based on social group
membership where state protection does not exist.'27 For example, the
CIRB found that a group of "'unprotected Zimbabwean women or girls
subject to wife abuse"' were a social group.'
Before In re R-A-, these
crucial developments in gender-based asylum jurisprudence, both within
the United States and internationally, provided an analytical model for
protection of an alien victim of domestic violence applying for asylum in
the United States. 9
II.

IN RE R-A-:

UNITED STATES CHANGES COURSE IN ADJUDICATING
GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS

A. Proceduraland FactualHistory of In re R-ARodi Adali Alvarado-Pena, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered
the United States in 1995 seeking asylum. In 1996, an IJ granted her request for asylum. 30 The IJ determined that Alvarado was persecuted on
account of her membership in a particular social group and on account of
her political opinion.3
First, the IJ determined that Alvarado's husband abused her physically, sexually, and emotionally by repeatedly raping and beating her. 32
During their ten years of marriage, he had dislocated her jaw, attempted
to cut her hands off with a machete, nearly pushed her eye out, broke
windows and mirrors with her head, and kicked her in the abdomen.'33
During a pregnancy, he "attempted to forcefully abort their second child
by kicking her in the spine. '1 These acts rose to the level of persecution
125.
126.

Islam, 2 [1999] All E.R. at 548.
Id. at 548.

127.

See Amici Brief, supra note 9, at 37 n.18 (citing numerous examples of the CIRB

finding social group membership for "woman fleeing domestic violence when their governments have been unable or unwilling to offer them protection").
128.
129.

Id. (quoting CIRB U92-06668 (Canada, Feb. 19, 1993)).
See generally id.

130. See In re Alvarado, No. A73-753-922, slip op. at 13 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco,
Cal., Sept. 20, 1996), rev'd, In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999).
131.

See id. at 9-12.

132.

See id at 7-8.

133.
134.

See id.
Id. at 7.
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even under "the most narrow interpretations., 13 Further, the IJ found
that Alvarado did not possess an internal flight alternative. She sought
protection from the police and the judicial system to no avail. 13 7 She
could not obtain a divorce because her husband would not consent; further, Guatemalan authorities never prosecuted her husband for the
abuse he inflicted."" These factors demonstrate the "institutional biases
against women that prevent female victims of domestic violence
from re139
ceiving protection from their male companions or spouses.,
The IJ also found that Alvarado's persecution was "on account of"
both her political opinion and her membership in a particular social
group. 140 The relevant political opinions were either express or imputed." ' Hence, the IJ made the factual determination that Alvarado's
husband believed that women were subordinate to men, and then concluded that when Alvardo resisted, her husband believed that she was
challenging his opinion.142 The IJ relied on the language in Lazo-Majano,
where the court concluded that a woman's flight from persecution that
was rooted in male dominance constituted a political opinion.
Another
important finding by the IJ regarding nexus to social group membership
was that Alvarado's husband abused her because he believed that female
partners should be dominated and controlled by violence. 44

135. See id. at 8.
136. See Amici Brief, supra note 9, at 6 (stating that the record "amply demonstrates
that Alvarado could not obtain protection from continuing abuse in Guatemala").

137. See id.
138. See id.
139. Alvarado, No. A73-753-922, slip op. at 8; see also Musalo, supra note 25, at 1179
n.14 (citing a 1990 survey of 1.000 women in Guatemala finding that 48% of respondents
were beaten by their partners). Not only is domestic violence pervasive in Guatemala, it
also exists in tandem with other forms of legalized discrimination against women. See id.
at 1179. The Guatemalan civil code recognizes the husband as the legal representative of
a married couple and allows a husband to "'legally forbid his wife to engage in activities
outside of the home."' Id. (quoting Tisdale, Abuse of Women in Today's Guatemala, 10
GUAT. BULL., No.4 (1992)).
140. See In re Alvarado, No. A73-753-922, slip op. at 9-10 (finding that the women are
"targeted by their male companions [who] attempt to control them through violence").
Beliefs of male dominance coupled with the absence of state protection established that
the persecution was "on account of" Alvarado's social group membership. See id. The IJ
defined social group membership as "Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under
male domination." Id. at 9.
141. See id. at 12.
142. See id. at 9-12.
143. See id. at 11 (citing Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1987)).
144. See id. at 8. "This Court is convinced that Osorio tormented her because he believed that the women with whom men are intimate should be dominated and controlled."
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B. The Board Reverses the ImmigrationJudge

The Board, sitting en banc, overturned the IJ's decision in a sharply divided 10-5 vote. 4' The Board did not dispute that Alvarado's suffering
amounted to persecution.' 46 It did not agree, however, that Alvarado was
a member of a particular social group that warranted asylum. 47 Further,
the Board found that there was no "nexus" between the persecution and
the husband's motivation for abusing his wife.14 8 Finally, it rejected the
IJ's finding that Alvarado was persecuted on account of political opinion,
either express or imputed. 49
Alvarado's case received national and international attention, 5 ° and
she appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 5 ' Members of Congress wrote a letter
to Attorney General Janet Reno urging her to reverse the decision.
The case also garnered national media attention due to the sharp division
filed a petition with the
in the Board's opinion.'53 Finally, Alvarado
54
CAT.
the
under
case
her
reopen
Board to
Id. at 9.
145. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 2 (BIA 1999).
146. See id. at 9 (stating that "the level of harm experienced [by Alvarado] rises beyond the threshold of that required for 'persecution"').
147. See id. at 2.
148. See id. (finding that "the respondent has failed to show that her husband was motivated to harm her, even in part, because of her membership in a particular social group
or because of an actual or imputed political opinion"). Furthermore, the Board found that
the record did not "indicate that the harm arose in response to any objections made by
respondent to her husband's domination over her." Id. at 11. But see In re Alvarado, No.
A73-753-922, slip op. at 4 (finding that "each time [Alvarado] protested or tried to get
help, the beatings worsened"). The IJ concluded that her husband "saw her continued
protests and attempts to leave him as an affront to his authority over her." Id.
149. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 12. Instead, the Board supported its decision, citing Elias-Zacarias,arguing that a woman must offer some evidence that her political opinion motivated her persecutor. See id. at 12. The dissent, however, found that even
after Elias-Zacarias,the notion of imputed political opinion survives, and that Alvarado's
abuser imputed such an opinion to her. See id. at 41-44 (Guendelsberger, Bd. Mbr., dissenting). Hence, the source of these differing interpretations regarding the extent to
which the battering husband's behavior was influenced by his perception of his victim's
opinion flows from disagreement over the breadth of application of the Supreme Court's
decision in Elias-Zacarias.
150. See infra notes 151-53.
151. See Musalo, supra note 25, at 1178.
152. See Letter from Members of the Hispanic Congressional Caucus to Attorney
General Janet Reno (July 22, 1999) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
"We cannot overstate our very strong support for timely action on your part to reverse
this extremely troubling decision." Id. at 1. The letter declares congressional leaders'
"unwavering" belief that Alvarado qualifies for asylum under the Act. See id.
153. See Susan Sachs, Fears of Rape and Violence: Women Newly Seeking Asylum,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1999; Tulsky, supra note 28.
154. See Petitioner's Motion to Reopen and Remand Pursuant to the Convention
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Whether or not the CAT is an avenue that decision makers will allow
alien victims of domestic violence to pursue successfully is a new queston. To date, the Board has not yet
56 issued a decision under the CAT
based on domestic abuse as torture.
C. The Torture Convention as an Alternative
The CAT prohibits the involuntary return of a person to a country
where the person would be in danger of torture.'57 In February 1999, the
INS issued the implementing regulations for the CAT.' Since then, the
CAT is "rapidly becoming a new source of protection for those fleeing
persecution and torture. ' " 9
An applicant must prove three elements under the CAT: the infliction
of severe pain, that the pain was committed for a specified purpose, and
that it was done with the consent, instigation, or acquiescence of a public
official. 6° Because the implementing regulations are so new, courts and
the BIA have decided few CAT cases to date, 6' therefore we have little
insight into the analysis that asylum
decision makers will give to issues
6
affecting domestic violence victims. 1
Against Torture, In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999) [hereinafter Motion to Reopen] (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
155. Interview with Morton Sklar, President of the World Organization Against Torture, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 1999).
156. See id.
157. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (2000). The United States ratified the CAT in 1990;
however, Congress failed to pass legislation implementing Article 3 until October 1998.
See Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2822 (1998) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231 note).
158. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4), (d)(1) (2000). The implementation of these regulations is significant because the Board had ruled that torture victims could not invoke these
protections in regular asylum proceedings in the absence of implementing legislation. See
Sklar, supra note 30 (citing In re H-M-V-, Interim Dec. 3365 (BIA 1998)).
159. Sklar, supranote 30.
160. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(6)-(7) (2000). The United States Senate ratified the
CAT, but imposed understandings and reservations concerning government involvement
with torture. See id. at § 208.18(a). The implementing regulations define torture as the
intentional infliction of severe physical or mental pain and suffering for specified purposes, "by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity." Id. § 208.18(a)(1) (emphasis added). Hence,
the torturous acts must occur within the context of government authority if they are to
provide the basis for an asylum claim. The implementing regulations construe the term
"acquiescence" to require that the public official be aware of the specific activity, prior to
the activity constituting torture, and subsequently breach a legal responsibility to intervene. See id. at § 208.18(a)(7).
161. See Sklar, supra note 30.
162. See generally INS Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Remand and Reopen,
In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999) [hereinafter INS Opposition Memorandum] (on
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III. NEW QUESTIONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: IN RE R-A- CLOSES
ONE DOOR BUT MAY OPEN ANOTHER

If the Board's decision in In re R-A- stands, women who bring asylum

claims alleging severe domestic violence have a weak chance for success.
Proponents of the CAT, therefore, believe that women should assert the
CAT and its implementing regulations in their petitions.
A. The Board'sApproach Raises Serious Obstaclesfor Domestic
Violence Claims
The Board's approach in In re R-A- narrows the interpretation of the63
elements of the Act and, therefore, limits domestic violence claims.'
The Board's analysis of In re R-A- is inconsistent with precedent regarding nexus, social group membership, and political opinion.' In light
element
of In re R-A-, the nexus requirement will be the most difficult
165
Act.
the
under
demonstrate
to
claimants
violence
for domestic
The Board criticized Alvarado's domestic violence claim by stating
that the applicant did not show how "other members of the group may
be at risk of harm from him,"' 66 meaning Alvarado's abusive spouse. In
that Althe context of intimate violence, this statement skews the reality
67
varado was harmed because of her unique status as his partner.
file with the Catholic University Law Review). The INS Opposition Memorandum relies
purely on statutory construction arguments, see generally id., because no relevant case law
exists.
163. See Fredric N. Tulsky, Asylum Denied for Abused Girl, WASH. POST, July 4,
1999, at A3 (reporting on the concerns and discouragement of attorneys representing
asylum seekers in the wake of the Board's decision in In re R-A-).
164. See generally In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999) (Guendelsberger, Bd.
Mbr., dissenting); see also Tulsky, supra note 28 (calling the decision the "latest zigzag in
U.S. immigration policies toward women").
165. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 17. The Board stated that even if it were to
accept "Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination" as a particular
social group, Alvarado failed to establish that "her husband has targeted and harmed [her]
because he perceived her to be a member of this particular social group." Id.; see also In
re Kuna (Immigr. Ct., Elizabeth, N.J., Sept. 1998), availableat <http://www.uchastings.edu/
cgrs/caselaw/kuna.html>. In Kuna, the IJheld that an abused woman from the Democratic Republic of Congo was not eligible for asylum. See id. The IJ found that, although
the respondent may have been a member of a particular social group, either as a Congolese woman, or as a Congolese woman who was unwilling to remain with a battering
spouse, the abuse she suffered was not "on account of" this membership. See id. The respondent "simply did not show that the violence against her [was] related to anything
more than the evil in the heart of her husband." Id. at 7.
166. In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 17 (emphasis added).
167. See id. at 4. Alvarado argued that Osorio's statements were examples of his belief
that he could dominate her because she was his wife. See id. When she left him, he believed that she defied his authority to control and dominate. See id. at 12. Therefore,
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1. The Board's Demandfor Proofof Motivation for the Domestic
Violence
In re R-A- provokes discussion as to whether the persecutor must be
consciously aware or able to articulate his motivation for inflicting
harm.'68 For example, the IJ and five members of the Board emphasized
the fundamental nature of domestic violence in order to infer the motivation of the persecutor, Alvarado's husband.'69 Likewise, a dissenting
Board member recognized that the purpose of domestic violence is to
"punish, humiliate, and exercise power over the victim on account of her
gender.' 70 The dissent presented a lucid argument that, consistent with
numerous domestic violence studies, one can infer motive based on a
batterer's attitude toward gender. 7 ' The dissent is bolstered by the Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women,'72 which states that domestic violence "not only derives from but
also sustains the dominant gender stereotypes and is used to control
women."'7 3 Thus, if a man denies that his violent behavior is a7 4problem,
it is reinforced by a "'conspiracy of silence' on a societal level.'
Research indicates that some men batter their wives because it is a socialized method of control over a female partner. 7 1 Others may act out
when he found her, he attacked and threatened her. See id. at 4.
168. See id. at 24 ("The dissent itself does not claim that either the respondent or her
husband understood the abuse to be motivated, even in part, by the respondent's political
opinion or social group membership."). The majority explores the different reasons
"why" Osorio abused his wife, concluding that, often, he did it for no reason at all. See id.
But see SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 221-22 (explaining that while abuse may appear to
be "out of the blue" or spurred by seemingly minor events, there is a "hidden rationality
for this seemingly irrational behavior" which is the "unstated power dynamic and the restoration of male authority").
169. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 40 (Guendelsberger, Bd. Mbr., dissenting).
170. Id.
171. See RHODE, supra note 1, at 244 ("Most available research indicates that assaultive behavior is learned behavior, and that abuse against women builds on traditional assumptions about gender roles.").
172. 11th Sess., GAOR 47th Sess., Supp. No. 38,
26, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992)
[hereinafter CEDA W Report]. This report arose out of the seminal international convention prohibiting discrimination against women and requiring states to act affirmatively to
eliminate discriminatory treatment by actors, both public and private. See CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION (CEDAW), G.A. Res.

34/180, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/46 (1980). As of this writing, the
United States is not a party to CEDAW.
173. CEDA W Report, supra note 172, at 26.
174.

CONSTANCE A. BEAN, WOMEN MURDERED BY THE MEN THEY LOVED 159

(1992).
175. See Glenda Kaufman Kantor & Jana L. Jasinski, Dynamics and Risk Factors in
Partner Violence, in PARTNER VIOLENCE 5 (Jana L. Jasinski & Linda M. Williams eds.,
1998). "At the societal level, cultural norms supporting unequal family power structures
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716
of frustration that they are unable to control their female partners.'
The question remains, therefore, whether a tribunal is too strict if it requires proof that a batterer is fully aware of why he is battering."' After
all, statements accepted as fact in In re R-A-, such as "You're my woman
and I can do whatever I want [to you],"'.7 provide subjective evidence
from which an adjudicator may infer motive. 7 9
Despite research-based analysis of abusive behavior,'80 the majority
emphasized Alvarado's failure to present subjective motivational evidence,'' amici curiae presented thorough discussion and research regarding the nature of domestic violence and its offenders.8 2 In certain
circumstances, this may be the only evidence of motivation that victims
of domestic violence are able to provide. It may be unrealistic, there-

or traditional gender roles may help explain some variations in rates of spousal violence.
In other words, males [who batter] are socialized to use violence to maintain control." Id.
176. See id. at 5.
177. See Shelley M. Hall, Quixotic Attempt? The Ninth Circuit, the BIA and the Search
for a Human Rights Framework to Asylum Law, 73 WASH. L. REV. 105, 112 (1998) (arguing that "the [U.S.] government should not deny protection to victims who had the misfortune of suffering under an unfocused persecutor"); cf. Maurice Goldman, The Violence
Against Women Act: Meeting Its Goal in Protecting Battered Immigrant Women?,
37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 375, 383, 385 (1999). Evidentiary standards for immigrant women who are victims of domestic violence by citizen spouses can also provide a
significant barrier to relief. See id. at 385. Federal regulations allow the women to selfpetition for residency and petition for suspension of removal in situations of extreme cruelty by their citizen spouse. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3) (2000). However, "women who did
not anticipate the need for a paper trail often have their petitions denied." Goldman, supra, at 385. Consequently, the unique circumstances of battered immigrant women,
whether living in the United States or seeking asylum here, create evidentiary obstacles
when these women attempt to seek the protections of U.S. law.
178. In re Alvarado, No. A73-753-922, slip op. at 4 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Cal.,
Sept. 20, 1996), rev'd, In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999) (reporting on the husband's response when his wife protested being sexually abused, both vaginally and anally,
on a daily basis).
179. See SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 219 (asserting that "[m]en are not necessarily
consciously aware of their need to dominate").
180. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 1, at 244.
181. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 2 (finding that respondent failed to show that
her husband's motivation to harm her fell within any of the statutory protected grounds).
182. See generally Amici Brief, supra note 9 (providing an extremely comprehensive
background on gender related violence in the context of asylum and international law and
discussing the reasons for violent spousal abuse).
183. See Understandingthe Problem, supra note 5, at 6-7. The chapter cited is an excerpt from United Nations' materials discussing theories that attempt to explain the existence or causes of domestic violence, which would relate to the "motivation" element of
the act. See id. Theories tie the reasons for domestic violence to individual factors or to
social and societal structures related to inequality. See id. Some scholars question the validity of theories that explain domestic violence by focussing on the individual. See id.
Rather, a social and societal explanation may be more accurate given the pervasiveness of
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fore, to demand particularized motivation evidence in the context of
spousal abuse.184
Adjudicators have access to extensive objective evidence regarding the
"motivation" of abusers.'
This does not mean that the "reasons" that
abuse occurs do not differ.'86 It does suggest, however, that courts could
view objective evidence provided by empirical research in conjunction
with an abuser's statements. 187 For example, Osorio threatened to kill
Alvarado and stated, "You're my woman and I can do whatever I
want."'8 This statement supports the notion that he acted, at least in
part, due to his wife's gender identity and the societal expectations of the
relationship of the husband and wife.189
2. The Law Allows for a Lesser Quantum of Proof Under Certain
Circumstances

The Supreme Court in INS v. Elias-Zacarias90stated that evidence of
motive can be "direct or circumstantial."' 9' In Abankwah v. INS,'12 the

domestic violence. See id.
184. Cf. Anker et al., supra note 11, at 741 n.163 (quoting In re S-P-, Interim Dec. 3287
at 5 (BIA 1996) ("'Proving the actual, exact reason for persecution or feared persecution
may be impossible in many cases [requiring such proof]"').
185. See Kantor & Jasinski, supra note 175, at 5 (discussing various studies of male
dominance and control). This objective evidence includes, for example, indications that in
some households males may use physical violence to legitimate their dominant positions.
See id. Further, "cultural norms supporting unequal family power structures or traditional
gender roles may help explain some variations in rates of spousal violence." Id. Frustration born from an inability to control the female partner may also spawn aggression. See
id.; see also SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 17 (asserting that battering is "purposeful behavior"). Schechter cites a study by R. Emerson Dobash and Russell Dobash, which concluded that "[w]hen a husband attacks his wife, he is either chastising her for challenging
his authority or for failing to live up to his expectations or attempting to discourage future
unacceptable behavior." Id. (quoting R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST PATRIARCHY 23-24 (1979)).

186. See Kantor & Jasinski, supra note 175, at 5.
187. See In re Kasinga, Interim Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June 13, 1996)
(finding the relevant inquiry of motive to be the fundamental socio-cultural purpose and
consequences of the practice of FGM).
188. In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 11 (BIA 1999) (internal quotations omitted).
189. Cf. RHODE, supra note 1, at 237. Professor Rhode argues that "[t]he conflicts
that give rise to domestic violence are rooted in broader power relations and social
norms." Id. Further, she contends that "[flamily violence is a symptom as well as a cause
of women's subordination." Id. at 244.
190. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
191. Id. at 483; see also Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 646-47 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that proof of subjective intent was not required because the definition of persecution is
objective).
192. 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999).
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court sharply criticized the Board's expectations of proof.1 93 The court's
criticism of the Board's strict evidence standard was related to the "objective" evidence that an applicant must present to prove credibility. The9
4
court's logic is also applicable to evidence regarding the nexus analysis.'
The Board itself has acknowledged that it is difficult to prove a persecutor's exact motivation.'9 Therefore, in In re R-A-, the Board could have
granted asylum based on evidence that motivation is often tied to societal attitudes about gender."'
3. The Board Uses a Restrictive View of Social Group Membership
The Board's restrictive approach in In re R-A- established a narrow
application of "social group membership. '"' 9 The Board viewed the
Acosta test as a basic requirement or "starting point," rather than a twopart inquiry.1 98 It relied on Sanchez- Trujillo v. INS to impose a more exacting standard that required proof of a "voluntary associational relationship among the purported members."' 99 Most courts outside of the
Ninth Circuit, however, have applied Acosta rather than SanchezTrujillo.2oo
The decision by the IJ in In re R-A- was consistent with the Board's
own decision in KasingaY°0 Both decisions defined social group membership by "reference to gender in combination with one or more additional
factors."'2° In Kasinga, the Board cited the Guidelines in support of its

193. See id. at 22-26 (noting that the applicant met her evidentiary burden to establish
well-founded fear, but that the Board failed to give the proffered evidence proper consideration).
194. See Musalo, supra note 25, at 1170, 1186 & n.76; see also Abankwah, 185 F.3d at
26 (stating that "it must be acknowledged that a genuine refugee does not flee her native
country armed with affidavits, expert witnesses, and extensive documentation").
195. See supra note 184.
196. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 41 (BIA 1999) (Guendelsberger, Bd. Mbr.,
dissenting) ("It is reasonable to believe, on the basis of the record before us, that the husband was motivated, at least in part, 'on account of' [Alvarado's] membership in a particular social group that is defined by her gender.").
197. See id. at 14-16 (finding that the proposed group satisfies the Acosta framework of
"social group," but characterizing this framework as a "basic requirement" rather than as
a two-part test). The Board determined that Acosta was more of a starting point rather
than an ending point. See id. at 16.
198. See id. at 14-16.
199. Id. at 8 (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986)).
200. See id. at 34-35 (Guendelsberger, Bd. Mbr., dissenting).
201. See Amici Brief, supra note 9, at 36. In Kasinga, the Board followed Canada's
lead when it granted asylum. See id.
202. See id. Compare In re Alvarado, No. A73-753-922, slip op. at 4 (Immigr. Ct., San
Francisco, Cal., Sept. 20, 1996) (defining the social group as "Guatemalan women who are
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decision to grant asylum based on FGM as persecution on account of social group membership.0 3 It specifically quoted the Guidelines, noting
that "'rape[,] ... sexual abuse, and domestic violence ... are forms of
mistreatment primarily directed at girls and women and they may serve
as evidence of past persecution on account of one or more of the five
grounds."' 2 After In re R-A-, advocates for applicants question the
Board's refusal to continue to apply the principles it established in
Kasinga. °5
B. The Trend in InternationalAdjudication of Domestic Violence
Asylum Claims is Contrary to the Board's Decision in In re R-AThere is a trend in the international community toward recognizing the
special needs of women refugees.' °6 Although Canada, Australia, Great
Britain, and the United States apply the identical definition of a refugee,' °7 these nations do not agree on the precise application of the definition.'08 Varying, albeit similar, interpretations exist in the jurisprudence
and internal guidance of each country; however, Canada, Great Britain,
and Australia have granted asylum based on domestic violence.2 " 9 In
light of In re R-A-, the United States stands alone, contrary to its previous congruence with the trend toward recognition of the needs of women
refugees." °
subjected to threat of violence from their former or current male companions, who believe
in male domination"), with In re Kasinga, Interim Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June
13, 1996) (describing the social group as "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe
who have not had FMG, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice"). Domestic abuse in Alvarado and FGM in Kasinga were forms of persecution that the respective communities accepted and sanctioned as cultural norms, thereby alleviating the possibility of state protection. See Amici Brief, supra note 9, at 36. Both forms of violence
share the overarching societal objective of assuring male domination. See id.
203. See Kasinga, 1996 WL 379826.
204. Id. (quoting INS Guidelines, supra note 19, at 4).
205. See Tulsky, supra note 28. Karen Musalo, counsel in the Kasinga case, stated,
"What is so distressing is that the Board seems either to have not understood its decision
in Kasinga,or is refusing to apply its own principles." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
206. See INS Guidelines supra note 19, at 1 (asserting that while "human rights violations against women are not a new phenomenon" they have recently "risen to the forefront of the international agenda").
207. See Macklin, supra note 48, at 25, 27.
208. See Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, 2 [1999] All E.R. 545 (H.L.)
(1999) (conjoined appeal with Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal & Another Ex
Parte Shah) (opinion of Lord Hope of Craighead) (stating that in the review of case law in
United States, Australia, Canada, and Great Britain, "no uniform interpretation [] has
emerged").
209. See Macklin, supra note 48, at 27-29.
210. See Musalo, supra note 25, at 1186; see also Tulsky, supra note 28 (quoting Deborah Anker, head of the Harvard University Immigration and Refugee Clinic, as stating

2000]

Asylum for Victims of Domestic Violence

The House of Lords, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the High
Court of Australia broadened the refugee concept to include gender-

based claims. 21 ' For example, in Islam, the House of Lords advocated the
importance of an evolutionary approach when considering international
agreements such as the Refugee Convention.

This approach enables

decision makers to account for "discriminatory circumstances which may
not have been obvious to the delegates when the Convention was being
'
also recThe United Nations High Commission on Refugees
framed."213
214
• •
ognizes that protection principles are evolving continuously.
Great Britain, Australia, and Canada accept gender as a social group,
and base their decisions on Acosta.215 In Islam, the House of Lords discussed its interpretation of Acosta and rejected Sanchez-Trujillo as "restrictive, 1.6 explicitly finding "no support" in the literature for the reaIn addition, English case law
soning asserted in Sanchez-Trujillo.2
contains no authority that cohesiveness is an indispensable requirement
Likewise, in Attorneyfor finding the existence of a social group."
General of Canada v. Ward, the Canadian Supreme Court also rejected
Sanchez-Trujillo;21 9 instead adopting the Acosta rationale by deciding
that gender could qualify as a particular social group.22 0
Each of these interpretations from leading Western nations clash with
the Board's decision that Alvarado was not a member of a particular social group.22 American variance from the international trend is difficult
that the decision "'was contrary to a growing body of international authority"').
211. See, e.g., Islam, 2 [1999] All E.R. at 569 (opinion of Lord Craighead); Attorney
Gen. of Canada v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689.
212. See Islam, 2 [1999] All ER at 568 (opinion of Lord Craighead) (citing Ward).
213. Id.
214. See Bemma Bonkoh, Regional Rep. UNHCR, Domestic Violence in the Context
of the Refugee Definition, Presentation at the Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace (July
28, 1999), available at <http://www.uchastings/cgrs/documents/unhcrdv.htm>.
215. See Islam, 2 [1999] All E.R. at 557 (opinion of Lord Steyn) ("The reasoning in the
Acosta case, which has been followed in Canada and Australia, is applicable.").
216. See id. 553-55 (opinion of Lord Steyn). "What is not justified is to introduce into
that formulation an additional restriction of cohesiveness. To do so would be contrary to
the ejusdem generis approach so cogently stated in Re Acosta." Id. at 555.
217. See id. at 555.
218. Seeid. at 554.
219. See Attorney Gen. of Canada v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R.689, 729-30.
220. See id. at 739; see also Islam, 2 [1999] All E.R. at 554 (Lord Steyn) (observing that
the Canadian Supreme Court in Ward adopted a broader approach based on Acosta).
221. Compare In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 14 (BIA 1999) (stating that Alvarado
was not a member of a particular social group absent "'a voluntary associational relationship"'), with Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 739 (finding that social group membership includes
individuals fearing persecution on the basis of gender), and Anker et al., supra note 11, at
743 n.178 (stating that the Canadian Federal Court found that women subjected to domes-
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to explain because the INS recognizes the framework provided by inter-

national human rights instruments as a source of guidance. 2

The

Guidelines explicitly acknowledge the influence of Canada's guidelines

stating that "more than two years after their release, the Canadian
Guidelines remain a model for gender-based asylum adjudication., 223 In
fact, Canada has since issued a newer version of its guidelines that "re-

peatedly recognize domestic violence as a cognizable basis for protection. '' 2 Because the INS Guidelines specifically recognize the influence
of Canadian and international standards, it is difficult to reconcile the
outcome of In re R-A- with sources that recognize gender-based violence
as persecution on account of social group membership. 5
C. Resistance to Protection Under the Act Forces Victims to Look
Elsewhere: Is Domestic Violence as Torture a Viable Alternative for
Protection?
Research indicates that severe domestic violence may amount to tor226
ture. 26 First, domestic violence involves severe physical harms that are
comparable to torture.2 7 For example, both forms of violence include
"beating with hands or objects, biting, spitting, punching, kicking, stabbing, strangling, scalding, burning, and attempted drowning. ''2 21 In addition, the psychological components of domestic violence are analogous to
torture.2 9 Thus, severe domestic violence can satisfy the first element of
tic abuse were a particular social group).
222. See INS Guidelines, supra note 19, at 2 (citing the INS BASIC LAW MANUAL
11-12 (2d ed. 1991)). In addition, the Guidelines state "[t]hese instruments need not be
ratified by the United States to provide guidance as a source of human rights norms." Id.
at 2 n.2.
223. Id. at 3; see also Macklin, supra note 48, at 29 (comparing the UNHCR, American, Australian, & Canadian guidelines).
224. Amici Brief, supra note 9, at 12-13 (citing Canadian Immigr. & Refugee Bd.,
Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution- Update
(Nov. 24, 1996)).
225. See Musalo, supra note 25, at 1186-87 (arguing that the Board's decision is counter to principles set forth in the Guidelines and in the adjudications of other nations).
226. See Anker et al., supra note 11, at 713. "Domestic violence often involves repeated physical assaults, under certain circumstances amounting to torture, frequently resulting in death." Id.
227. See Copelon, supra note 8, at 311-12.
228. Id. at 311.
229. See id. at 311-12, 319 (identifying threats of death and grave physical harm as psychological torture, as noted by the Human Rights Committee); see also Liane V. Davis,
Domestic Violence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL WORK 780, 782 (1991). Davis reports
that Schechter "identified five tactics of emotional spouse abuse: (1) isolation, (2) humiliation and degradation, (3) "crazy-making" behavior, (4) threats to harm the woman and
those she loves, and (5) suicidal and homicidal threats." Id. "Often among the most in-
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the CAT: intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering.230
Second, under the CAT, the harm must be inflicted for a specific purpose, such as to intimidate, coerce, or punish.13 ' The purposes of domestic violence are to intimidate and exercise power over women.232 Canadian officials analogized the severity and purpose of domestic violence to
torture, comparing a torture chamber with an abusive home, in the case
of an Ecuadorian woman whose husband raped and beat her for over ten
years. 233
Third, private acts are torture if they are carried out with the "consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. ''23 This could include private violence against women where
there is not state intervention. Based on this paradigm, domestic abuse
can rise to the level of torture, suggesting the use of the CAT as an avenue for protection aside from the traditional petition under the INA.
There are two significant differences between the CAT and the INA.236
An applicant proceeding under the CAT does not have to show that the
harm was inflicted on account of one of five categories as she does under
the INA. However, actions that the INA considers "persecution" may

sidious forms of torture are those that do not involve overt brutality." Copelon, supra
note 8, at 313. For example, batterers and torturers may threaten to harm family members
or children, or to abuse a woman in front of her children. See id. More subtle methods of
abuse include unpredictable punishments and rewards. See id. at 314. Torture victims and
battered women suffer similar consequences, including post-traumatic stress disorders.
See id. at 315-16.
230. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2000).
231. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)-(3).
232. See CEDAW Report, supra note 172, at 26 (stating that the fundamental purpose of domestic violence is to punish, humiliate, and exercise power over the victim).
233. See Anker et al., supra note 11, at 727-28. The CIRB has compared a torture
chamber to an abusive home:
[i]f a wife is subjected to violence, repeatedly, then in our assessment, she stands
in no different a situation than a person who has been arrested, detained and
beaten on a number of occasions because of his political opinion. As a matter of
fact, [that person] suffers to a lesser degree over a period of time, because after
each detention he is released and enjoys his freedom. The wife on the other
hand has no respite from her agony of torture and grief. She must endure these
misfortunes continuously.
Id. (quoting CIRB Decision No. U92-08714 (1993)) (internal quotation omitted).
234. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
235. See Copelon, supra note 8, at 355 (confirming that a broad reading of acquiescence would include private violence against women where the state does not act). Further, even those who would require strict state involvement recognize that torture may
exist where the state "does or condones" the act. See id. at 355 n.231.
236. See Sklar, supra note 30.
237. See id.
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not rise to the definition of torture under the CAT.238 The United States'
version of the CAT implies that adjudicators may require a higher level
of government involvement than the original treaty mandates.23 9 Therefore, although domestic violence applicants proceeding under the CAT
will not be required to prove that harm occurred "on account of" a protected category (as they must under the INA), they may find 2it40 difficult
to prove the requisite government involvement under the CAT.
The abuse that Alvarado suffered arguably meets the statutory elements of the CAT.2 4' Just as a clear division exists in interpretation of
the INA, however, early signs suggest that the same is true for the CAT,
particularly regarding the element of "government acquiescence. 2 42 To
prove acquiescence, an applicant must show that government officials
had prior awareness of the activity and thereafter breached their legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.2 43 The INS opposed
Alvarado's argument under the CAT, stating that "[i]n this case, there
simply is no evidence that any government official had ... prior knowledge about a specific incident of abuse, and breached a legal duty to prevent it. '244 In contrast, the Board's dissent explicitly found that the
"harm to [Ms. Alvarado] occurred in the context of egregious governmental acquiescence., 245 Specifically, Alvarado sought government assistance after her husband abused her; both the police and a judge knew of
the continuous life threatening abuse, but refused to intervene.246 Although the INS denied that Guatemalan government officials breached a

238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See generally Motion to Reopen, supra note 154.
242. Compare id. at 1 (arguing that Alvarado's claim satisfies each element of the
CAT), with INS Opposition Memorandum, supra note 162, at 4 (arguing that there was no
government acquiescence).
243. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7) (2000).
244. INS Opposition Memorandum, supra note 162, at 4. But see Petitioner's Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen and Remand Pursuant to the Convention
Against Torture at 5, In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999) [hereinafter Reply to INS
Opposition] (arguing that the INS interpretation is "illogical" and "contrary to the intent
and language of the CAT" and "would lead to irrational results"). The INS interpretation,
in essence, precludes many gender-based claims. See id. The requirement of consent and
acquiescence would impose extreme limitations. See id. In the INS' view, an applicant
could satisfy the "consent and acquiescence" requirement only if a private actor told a
public official exactly how he was going to torture someone and, after the public official
took no action, the private actor carried out his torture exactly as threatened. See id.
245. In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 29 (Guendelsberger, Bd. Mbr., dissenting).
246. See id.
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legal duty, 47 Alvarado argued that those officials had a legal responsi-

bility under
• 248 international law to respond to her repeated requests for
protection. This conflict suggests a new tension in the law and an obstacle to deploying the CAT for protection from this type of harm.249
In addition to legal duty, "acquiescence" requires that an act "must be
250
directed against a person in the offender's custody or physical control.,
2
The interpretation of "control" is critical for domestic violence victims.

1

Alvarado's argument is compelling: one who repeatedly flees her batterer, only to be found and severely beaten by him, is under the batter's
physical control where she has no government protection. 252 However,
the INS criticized her attempts to escape Osorio because she went to stay
with family, which the agency characterized as "[an] obvious place[] to
begin a search., 253 Yet, considering Alvarado's presence in a country
where there are few safe or secret avenues of escape, 254 the INS criticism
is weak. The Board accepted as true medical testimony that Alvarado
247. See INS Opposition Memorandum, supra note 162, at 4.
248. See Motion to Reopen, supra note 154, at 11-12 (citing the American Convention
on Human Rights, Arts. 5, 25 (1969)). Guatemala is a signatory state of the American
Convention on Human Rights; therefore, it is required to develop and enforce remedies to
protect the rights of every person to "simple and prompt recourse and a competent court
for protection from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment." Id. at 11-12.
249. See Sklar, supra note 30. The specific limits imposed by the Senate understandings, which impose a higher level of government involvement, may be inconsistent with
the CAT requirements. See id. The stipulations requiring "prior awareness" of the activity and the breach of a legal responsibility to intervene to prevent the activity may "impose unnecessary and inappropriate roadblocks to coverage of such widely condemned
acts as FGM ... and atrocities committed by private and paramilitary groups." Id. Professor Sklar argues that the understandings alter or undermine the basic treaty requirements. See id,
250. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(6) (2000).
251. See Reply to INS Opposition, supra note 244, at 6.
252. See Motion to Reopen, supra note 154, at 12-13.
253. INS Opposition Memorandum, supra note 162, at 7. But see Motion to Reopen,
supra note 154, at 15 (noting that at Alvarado's hearing, an expert witness testified that
she was not aware of any shelters for battered women in Guatemala).
254. See Motion to Reopen, supra note 154, at 15.
255. See INS Opposition Memorandum, supra note 162, at 6. Disputing the control
issue, the INS contended that Alvarado "chose to return to her husband after leaving him
and moving to another town." Id. But see In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 4 (BIA 1999)
(recognizing that Alvarado could not legally obtain a divorce, that Alvarado "knew of no
shelters or other organizations in Guatemala that could protect her," and, accepting as
true, testimony that her husband found her and beat her when she fled, suffering no punishment for his actions); see also Reply to INS Opposition, supra note 244, at 6-7.
The Service attempts to bolster their contention by criticizing Ms. Alvarado for
seeking refuge with her family because that would be an obvious hiding place...
The CAT does not, as the Service asserts, require a petitioner to orphan oneself
in exile in order to be eligible for protection.
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"possessed an extraordinary fear of her husband., 256 This indicates that
she would believe his threats to come find her and any "choice" would be
physically and psychologically unavailable to her.257
Finally, law enforcement practices that implicitly condone or minimize
the seriousness of gender-based violence reflect "consent of the state as
well as formal gender discrimination., 258 Adjudicators could find state
"acquiescence" where women have no state protection,259 as in the case
of Alvarado.26 It is not, however, an argument certain to prevail, and
currently, applicants must consider both the INA and the CAT in pursuit
of protection with the very real possibility that the IJ or the Board will
still deny them asylum.
D. In re R-A- Is Counter To Policy ConsiderationsThat Mandate
Protection
The Board asserts that legislative correction is necessary for it to accede to asylum requests like Alvarado's.26 Nevertheless, there is strong
support for the argument that the INS should interpret the Refugee Act
to grant asylum to victims of domestic violence when their own countries
fail to protect them.262 In its effort to scrutinize each element separately,
the Board has lost sight of the overall humane purposes of the INA.263
Domestic policy also dictates protection for victims of domestic abuse.
President Clinton recently declared that the United States is "committed
to the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms."2' 6 Through an Executive Order, the government is required to
"fully respect and implement its obligations under the international huId.
256. In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 5.
257. The notion that Alvarado had a choice completely ignores her fear for her life,
developed from years of brutal, life-threatening violence and threats. Cf. id. at 3-6 (describing the "deplorable conduct" of Alvarado's husband and conditions in-country).
258. Copelon, supra note 8, at 355-56.
259. See id. When women make complaints of serious violence to law enforcement
and officials do not respond, state acquiescence enables the abuse to continue. See id.
260. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 4-5.
261. See id. at 27.
262. See Letter from Members of the Hispanic Congressional Caucus to Attorney
General Janet Reno, supra note 152 (concluding that legislative action is not necessary
because Alvarado already qualifies under a fair and uniform application of current law).
263. Cf. KOURULA, supra note 5, at 89. Kourula refers to the "sliver approach," noting that the scrutiny of each element undermines the overall purpose of the Refugee Convention. See id. "The sliver approach has led to a number of legal and practical problems,
including progressively fragmented interpretations of the components of the refugee definition." Id.
264. Exec. Order No. 13,107, 3 C.F.R. 234 (1999-2000).
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man rights treaties to which it is a party. ' '16 Under The Refugee Act and
the CAT, governments are obligated to protect victims who face persecution or torture in their own countries.26 Alvarado's husband has stated
that he will kill her if she returns to Guatemala.26 ' Therefore, if the
United States deports her, it is not only failing in its obligation to protect
her, but it is essentially sending her to her death.
IV. A FORWARD LOOKING SOLUTION: THE UNITED STATES SHOULD
DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO PROTECTION OF WOMEN
REFUGEES UNDER ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND DOMESTIC POLICY

Respect and implementation of the United States' obligations necessitates protection of victims of severe gender-based violence.26 Thus, the
Board's decision in In re R-A- is a step backward.269
Developments in domestic law and social programs for victims of domestic violence indicate the depth of public understanding about the severity of domestic violence.2 0 The lack of protection available in light of
In re R-A-, however, indicates that responsiveness to gender issues is still
inadequate under current immigration law.271 The level of abuse that
some women endure rises to the level of persecution under the "most
narrow ... definitions., 272 In many cases, domestic violence that continues without state intervention is a human rights violation comparable to
torture.273 The protections for victims of harsh intimate violence, however, are shaky and uncertain at best, if they exist at all.274 The Ninth
Circuit should shore up these protections by reversing the Board's decision in In re R-A-. Reversal is appropriate based on interpretation of

265. Id.
266. See Sklar, supra note 30; Amici Brief, supra note 9, at 8-14 (explaining the current
standards of asylum law that support Alvarado's claim).
267. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 5 (BIA 1999).
268. See supra Part III.D.
269. See Letter from Members of the Hispanic Congressional Caucus to Attorney
General Janet Reno, supra note 152, at 3 (stating that the decision is a step backward).
270. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (discussing the emergence of community, police, and governmental responses to domestic violence and violence against
women).
271. See Musalo, supra note 25, at 1185 (discussing the implications of the Board's decision).
272. See In re Alvarado, No. A73-753-922, slip op. at 8 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco,
Cal., Sept. 20, 1996).
273. See generally Copelon, supra note 8; supra Part III.C.
274. See supra Parts III.A-B; see also Tulsky, supra note 28. After the Board's decision in In re R-A-, Jane Kroeshe, the respondent's attorney, asked, "'If she is not protected, what kind of woman would be?"' Id.
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current case law, as well as policy.

A. Recognition of the EvolutionaryApproach in Orderto Address the
Needs of Women Refugees
The United States should adhere to an evolutionary approach in its interpretation of the Act and social group membership.276 When the
United Nations drafted the Refugee Convention, society did not possess
the same understanding of the needs of women refugees nor did it recognize the severe forms of violence against women.277 In order to respond
to these needs, the United States must recognize that gender is a form of
social group where there is no state protection from violence.278 Clearly,
there is an international trend to afford protection to domestic violence
victims in these circumstances.27 9
The Board's hesitation to allow gender as a social group factor has no
basis in law."" Decision makers must determine whether a social group
exists by its characteristics, not by the size of the group." Denial of protection by tightening social group membership is consistent only with
hesitation to open the "floodgates" to large numbers of immigrants.
This fear is unwarranted, however, because it is difficult for women to
leave their batterers and even more difficult to gain the means to flee
their countries of origin to do S0.283 Further, the recognition of claims
based on domestic violence does not dictate the outcome of all claims

275. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 29 (BIA 1999) (Guendelsberger, Bd. Mbr.,
dissenting) (concluding that the majority's insistence that Alvarado's husband did not
harm her "'even in part, because of her membership in a particular social or because of an
actual or imputed political opinion' cannot be reconciled with. . . United States law").
The majority's holding is at odds with "our own precedent, federal court authority, and
Department of Justice policy." Id. (Guendelsberger, Bd. Mbr., dissenting).
276. See supra Part III.B (discussing the evolutionary approach).

277. See KOURULA, supra note 5, at 131-38.
278. See Anker et al., supra note 11, at 715.
279. See Musalo, supra note 25, at 1186.
280. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 29 (Guendelsberger, Bd. Mbr., dissenting)
(arguing that the decision not to recognize Alvarado as a member of a social group "cannot be reconciled either with the reality of [her] situation in Guatemala or with United
States law").
281. See In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211,233 (BIA 1985).
282. See Hall, supra note 177, at 110 (concluding that the Board's narrower interpretation of the Act's elements "often relied on political, 'floodgate' concerns when denying
asylum claims"); see also KOURULA, supra note 5, at 63. The "interpretation of the refugee definition is influenced not only by legal considerations but also by political expediencies and economic realities as well as the size of a particular refugee influx." Id.
283. See Seith, supra note 46, at 1839 (noting the difficulties and expense of fleeing
one's country).
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that involve intimate violence."4
Other countries recognizing claims based on violence against women
have not been overwhelmed; neither Canada nor Australia is overwhelmed by claims as a result of more responsive asylum decisions.
Researchers analyzed the number of applications after Canada's recognition of claims based on fear of FGM. 86 Statistics demonstrate that the
2 87
decisions granting asylum did not generate a large influx of claimants.
Therefore, even political sentiments that are anti-immigration need not
force the return of women like Alvarado to a situation of grave danger.m
B. Considerationof Research-BasedKnowledge of Domestic Violence for
Persecutor'sMotivation
Decision makers could alleviate some of the problems created in light
of In re R-A- by giving adequate weight to expert testimony that relies on
domestic violence research. The women's movement has influenced
other areas of the law, forcing discriminatory practices to change. 8 9 The
same changes should occur in asylum law. Courts recognize the difficulties in determining the exact motive of a persecutor. 29° Consequently,
they have allowed mixed-motive analysis, and consideration of direct and
circumstantial evidence.' 9' Moreover, the Abankwah court recently
noted the dangerous circumstances that a claimant faces when fleeing her
284. See Anker et al., supra note 11, at 715 (observing that decisions are made on an
individual or case-by-case basis). Domestic violence will not always rise to the level of
persecution. See id. Therefore, simply recognizing gender as a possible social group does
not mean that every one who is beaten is eligible for asylum. See id.
285. See Macklin, supra note 48, at 34.
286. See id.
287. See id.
At a minimum, however, it appears safe to assert that the appearance of the
Guidelines in Canada in 1993 did not lead to a "flood" of women seeking asylum
.... The numbers of positive [gender-based] claims decided in accordance with
the Canadian Guidelines since they were promulgated in March, 1993 are: 78 in
1993, 204 in 1994, 212 in 1995, 150 in 1996, 104 in 1997, and 95 in 1998 (through
September).
Id.
This data includes the years after 1996 when the revised version of the Canadian Guidelines specifically mentioned domestic violence several times as a possible claim. See id.
288. See Esta Soler, Denying Asylum to A Battered Woman, WASH. POST, Nov. 8,
1999, at A21.
289. See supra note 3 (discussing the role of women's organizations in improving police response to domestic violence in the United States).
290. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 40 (BIA 1999) (Guendelsberger, Bd. Mbr.,
dissenting) (articulating that under federal case law, "[i]llegitimate motives can give rise to
an inference that the harm occurred on account of a statutorily protected characteristic").
291. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1991).
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home country, and therefore accepted a less than perfect showing of objective evidence.2 The court also reprimanded the Board for its "exacting" demand.2 93
Asylum adjudicators should apply the same realistic evidentiary standards employed in Abankwah in cases of applicants claiming domestic
violence. 9 4 Researchers have widely studied the motivations of batterers, and much evidence establishes that their motivations are related to
gender and control.2 95 The courts should allow the use of these studies,
and infer motive in cases with facts that corroborate such a finding. 296
Failure to comprehend fully the motivation for a particular actor's continuous brutal battering should not weaken a woman's claim. 97 Conversely, the ability partially to understand domestic
violence due to social
298
claim.
the
strengthen
should
science research
C. The Torture Convention: Provide ClearInterpretationsof
Acquiescence that are Consistent with the Purpose of the CAT
If the United States is not willing to expand protection under the Act,
the CAT represents a new avenue for protection.29 The United States
has an opportunity to provide a fresh start in adjudication of severe domestic violence claims.3°° United States immigration courts should interpret the element of "acquiescence" broadly.3 ' A broad interpretation of
state involvement in a CAT analysis is consistent with the CAT's pur-

292. See Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir. 1999).
293. See id.
294. See Amici Brief, supra note 9, at 5.
295. See supra Part III.A.1.
296. See In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 10 (BIA 1999). "The respondent has established that there is a basic patriarchal notion which prevails in Guatemala that a man
should be able to control the women, whom they are or have been involved with .... " Id.
When men attempt to control women through violence in Guatemala, nothing is done to
punish them. See id.; see also id. at 28 (Guendelsberger, Bd. Mbr., dissenting) (determining that "the respondent's husband engaged in ... abuse designed to dominate and to
overcome any effort on her part to assert her independence or to resist his abuse").
297. See id. at 39 (Guendelsberger, Bd. Mbr., dissenting) (concluding that "the very
incomprehensibleness of the husband's motives supports the respondent's claim that the
harm is 'on account' of a protected ground").
298. Cf id. at 39-40 (Guendelsberger, Bd. Mbr., dissenting). "Domestic violence exists
as a means by which men may systematically destroy the power of women, a form of violence rooted in the economic, social, and cultural subordination of women." Id. (citing
Copelon, supranote 8, at 303-06).
299. See Sklar, supra note 30.
300. See id.
301. See id.
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pose of preventing the return of a victim to her torturer.'02 Courts should
find that acquiescence by the government exists when a state knowingly
denies assistance to a victim of continuous beating!" The current position taken by the INS in Alvardo's case rejects this approach, advocating
an unrealistic standard for state involvement?3° A broader approach,
however, provides an appropriate balance because protection is limited
to circumstances where the applicant sought assistance and a government
official denied it, despite the official's knowledge that the abuse was ongoing.05
D. Improving Protectionand Decreasingthe Harm
A more generous policy toward domestic violence victims would not
create an overwhelming burden on the immigration system. First, a
country may improve over time in the way that it reacts to domestic violence.3 Second, increased international pressures on countries that do
not protect women may force them to react differently.3 O Improvements
will alleviate the need for women to flee."' Consistent state recognition
of gender-based violence elevates its importance.3°9 Recognition increases the pressure on these states with inadequate protections to im-

302. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4), (d)(1) (2000).
303. See Reply to INS Opposition, supra note 244, at 4 (arguing that the "government's failure to come to Ms. Alvarado's aid [despite reports of the beatings] meets even
the [INS'] purported requirement [of acquiesence]").
304. Compare INS Opposition Memorandum, supra note 162, at 4-5 (arguing that
even though respondent sought government assistance after her husband abused her and a
judge knew of the continuous life threatening abuse, the knowledge did not qualify as acquiescence), with Motion to Reopen, supra note 154, at 10 (arguing that Guatemala's failure to take meaningful action constitutes acquiescence). "A Guatemalan Judge specifically told Ms. Alvarado that he would not interfere in domestic disputes, thus consenting
and acquiescing to the torture .... " Id. Once the level of violence escalates to this level,
it becomes practically certain that, absent intervention, it will happen again. See HEALEY
ET AL., supranote 2, at 20.
305. See Motion to Reopen, supra note 154, at 13. Alvarado's attorneys do not argue
that domestic violence always constitutes torture. Rather, their argument turns on the definitive refusal by the state to act. See id.
306. See supra note 1 (explaining the dramatic improvements in domestic violence
recognition and services that occurred in the United States from the 1970s to the 1990s).
307. See INS Guidelines, supra note 19, at 2 (citing CEDAW).
308. Although this Comment does not argue that this is likely to happen quickly and in
all countries, there is reason to think that advocates for women can make progress due to
the existence of numerous international instruments demanding state action. See Amici
Brief, supra note 9, at 10 (citing international pronouncements that recognize the need to
respond to violence against women worldwide).
309. See Seith, supranote 46, at 1842.
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prove protections internally.""
Finally, recognition of claims is consistent with domestic policy.3" A
woman's right to be free from the "threat of domestic violence is a fundamental and universal human right. 3 12 Administrative and judicial actions denying asylum to victims whose human rights have been severely
violated are far from respectful of the United States' commitment to protect and promote women's rights. As a nation, we should not place political calculations regarding immigration ahead of justice.313
V.

CONCLUSION

The visibility of women who suffer from domestic violence is increasing, as are their cries for help. For some, international protection is their
only possibility for safety. The purpose of both the INA and the CAT
overwhelmingly goes against the return of women refugees such as Alvarado to their home countries. When there is disagreement about the
extent of protection offered by current laws in the United States, asylum
decision makers should resolve any conflict in interpretation in an applicant's favor. Adjudicators agreed that Alvarado has no remedy for the
horrific abuse in her home country. Her situation is the very kind that
asylum law exists to protect. The fundamental purpose of refugee law is
to provide protection in response to human rights violations when there
is a fundamental breakdown in state protection. International guidance
and domestic policy specifically recommends that courts interpret asylum
law to include domestic violence. A remedy is necessary, and protection
is the only humane option.

310. See id. at 1842-43. In contrast, a refusal to legitimate women's plights and grant
asylum merely de-emphasizes its importance. See Amici Brief, supra note 9, at 5 (arguing
that the INS position in Alvarado's case trivializes the severity of domestic violence and
fails to employ the commitments expressed in the INS Guidelines).
311. See INS Guidelines, supra note 19, at 2 (providing that "the evaluation of genderbased claims [in the United States] must be viewed within the framework provided by existing international human rights instruments and the interpretation of these instruments
by international organizations"); see also Exec. Order No. 13,107, 3 C.F.R. 234 (19992000).
312. Understandingthe Problem, supra note 5, at 7.
313. See Soler, supra note 288; see also Tulsky, supra note 28. "The majority's opinion
reflects the caution that many Immigration Judges and U.S. officials feel about allowing
new categories of eligible asylum seekers that would open the floodgates to large numbers
of new claims ....
" Id.

